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ABSTRACT
Organizations typically construct computer access password policies that request or require employees to create “strong”
passwords.  Challenges arise for these employees in attempting to conform to a long list of difficult and potentially
conflicting criteria.  This dissertation research-in-progress uses concepts from Behavioral Reasoning Theory, General
Deterrence Theory, and other theories to examine the conflicting nature of such policies and their impact on password
security behaviors.   Results are expected to show that traditional countermeasures, while useful in preventing some IS
misuse, are not as effective in preventing password misuse, in part because alternative reasons exist that motivate individuals
to engage in insecure behaviors.  Contributions to academic research and implications for practitioners are discussed.
Keywords
passwords, security, IS misuse, password policies, Behavioral Reasoning Theory, General Deterrence Theory
INTRODUCTION
Organizations typically construct computer access password (PW) policies that request or require employees to create
“strong” passwords.  Challenges arise for these employees in attempting to conform to a long list of difficult and potentially
conflicting criteria.  These criteria usually include: passwords should be at least eight or nine digits long; they should be
composed of a combination of numbers, letters, and punctuation; they should not include recognizable words, names, or
dates; and, they must changed periodically.1  Policies generally include a list of prohibited behaviors as well as proscribed
penalties  for  violators.  However,  the  effect  of  these  password  security  policies  seems  to  be  that  many  users,  in  trying  to
comply with the difficult and conflicting restrictions, will engage in behaviors that are not secure, such as writing down and
sharing passwords.
Research tells us that IS misuse is costly, although the portion attributed to PW misuse is difficult to isolate.  According to
Campbell et al. (2003) “public disclosure of incidents of  unauthorized access resulted in significant drop in stock prices”.
Insider abuse of network access and unauthorized access by insiders are two of the most severe IS threats (Mehta and George
2001).  Recent FBI crime statistics show that approximately 60 percent of industry and government respondents detected
costly insider abuse of network security.   In recent years, several high-profile breaches of IS security have put a spotlight on
the need to protect personal data; legislative mechanisms are being implemented to enforce such protection.   Thus it is not
surprising that organizations would continuously strive to create security policies that would restrict the ability of individuals
(both insiders and outsiders) to access information that needs to be kept secure.
It would appear that the development of password creation guidelines has been largely ad hoc:  as both computing power and
hacker motivation and skills have increased, IT professionals have tried to prevent security breaches by making  passwords
long, difficult to remember, and short-lived  Alternatives to remembering passwords, such as biometrics and RFID tokens,
may assist with some of the challenges.  However, these are costly, can also be hacked (Furnell 2005), and do not address the
behavioral causes of PW misuse.  That is, while a technology solution may replace the need to remember strong passwords, it
will not solve the portion of PW misuse that is volitional: for example, individuals who are motivated to share passwords
may be just as likely to share devices.
1 See, for example, "Sample Password Policy." Receivables Report for America's Health Care Financial Managers 20, 7 (2005), 6-
7.
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IS literature uses several vague and overlapping terms, such as “IS misuse” or “password hygiene”, to describe aspects of
password behavior.  For clarity, the term “password compliance” will be used in this paper.  It refers to an individual’s
voluntary adherence to password security guidelines that are communicated by the organization.   It specifically does not
include adherence to these guidelines when such adherence is forced.  For example, if a password management program
specifically prevents an individual from creating a weak password (by checking new passwords against dictionaries,
password histories, and algorithms) then that particular behavior is not part of password compliance.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Several behavioral, cognitive, and economic theories lend important explanations for concepts within IS security and
passwords compliance behavior.
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) establish
the connection between an intent to behave in a certain manner and the actual behavior.  This is an important linkage in much
of the extant IS security literature because many types of IS security breaches are difficult to measure or are kept private by
companies who do not wish their security problems to become public knowledge.  Thus, while IS researchers generally point
to the estimated total dollar value of IS security problems, they are frequently unable to capture data on specific breaches
(and their costs).  The connection shown in TRA and TPB between “intent” and “actual behavior” allows the assumption that
if we can impact individual intent (and its antecedents:  attitude, subjective norm, and perceived control), then we can effect a
real impact on actual secure behavior.
General Deterrence Theory, as used by Straub (1990), shows that severity and certainty of countermeasures (or sanctions)
are possible mechanisms to reduce the intent to commit IS misuse, therefore likely reducing actual misuse.  Further applying
this theory to IS security, D’Arcy (2005) found that countermeasures were effective in preventing certain contemporary types
of IS misuse, such as excessive web-surfing during work hours or forwarding of feedback from several respondents.
However, password-sharing was dropped from the model in part because feedback from respondents suggested that such
sharing was not perceived by them as “IS misuse”. Therefore, the concept “IS misuse” needs to be further clarified and the
various types of password misuse (e.g., revealing a password, requesting another’s password, recording a password in an
insecure location, and choosing a weak password) need to be defined and measured.   Countermeasures themselves also need
to be further clarified.  It might be that by solely examining formal, explicit sanctions (e.g., “you will be disciplined or
terminated if you engage in IS misuse”), we are ignoring the possible effects of “informal” sanctions (e.g., “if you forget your
password,  you  will  be  locked  out  of  the  system  and  you  may  have  to  interface  with  the  sysadmin”).   These  informal  (or
implicit) sanctions may be acting as disincentives for individuals to engage in secure PW behaviors.
A useful method of examining both these formal and informal sanctions arises from Behavioral Reasoning  Theory (Westaby
2005).  This theory incorporates and validates the connections between attitude, intention, and behavior that are shown by
TRA and TPB.  However, BRT extends the argument by positing antecedents to the “global motives” (attitude, subjective
norm, and perceived control); the immediate antecedents of these global motives are “reasons”.  These reasons are specific to
the individual and/or the circumstances;  that is, an individual could have an attitude or a perception of a subjective norm that
might suggest one behavior but  a specific reason may exist why that individual might act contrary to the attitude or norm in a
certain circumstance.  These specific reasons are shown to impact intention both indirectly (as mediated by global motives)
and also directly.  An important concept in Behavioral Research Theory is that there can be both reasons “for” and “against”
behavior.  That is, it subsumes any number of dichotomized dimensions: e.g., pro/con, cost/benefit, facilitating/constraining.
Another interesting element of BRT is that it conceives of reasons as “temporally oriented”:  anticipated (future-looking),
concurrent, and post hoc. Post hoc reasons  may  be  used  by  individuals  to  rationalize  or  justify  their  actions  when  those
actions are not consistent with their attitudes or other global motives (thus diminishing cognitive dissonance).
Information Processing Theory (IPT)  (Miller 1956) holds that the maximum number of random characters that individuals
can remember is 7 +/- 2.  Use of mnemonics and other techniques may assist in the retention of strong passwords in short-
term memory.   Alternatively, after a period of repetition and coding, a strong password could be passed from short-term
memory to long-term memory. Two simultaneous password guidelines do not seem to present serious difficulties. Aytes and
Connolly (2004) demonstrate that it is cognitively feasible both to change passwords periodically and also not share
passwords;  Stanton et al.  (2004) show that individuals are readily able to change passwords periodically and also select
strong passwords.   It appears, however, that attempting to comply with more than two simultaneous restrictions is taxing to
individual cognition and therefore causes difficulty in complying with password policies.  The cognitive restrictions shown in
IPT and these other cognitive studies are likely to be components of the “perceived control” aspect of TRA/TPB and also
may exist as “post hoc” reasons for non-compliance with password policies, according to BRT.
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These theories serve to explain the current relationship between individual reasons, global motives, intention, and behavior.
It may be that further extending these arguments to password compliance will afford ample contributions to our knowledge of
IS security.  However, practitioners may be more interested in not just what these relationships explain, but also what can be
done with this knowledge to impact actual IS security.  Two additional theories seem to lend assistance:
Agency Theory  (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) describes the relationship that exists between a principal (i.e., employer) and an
agent (i.e., employee) when their goals may conflict.  The principal may decide to use a mechanism (e.g., profit-sharing) to
encourage the employee to bring his goals in tandem with the employer’s goals.   A potential application of agency theory to
PW misuse is to introduce an incentive that will encourage the employee to engage in secure password behaviors to protect
his/her own self-interest, thereby also protecting the employer’s security interests.
Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1983) examines a similar circumstance, in which an individual is interested in
preserving his or her own self-interest.  However, instead of introducing incentives to encourage certain behavior, the theory
says that individuals will seek to protect themselves if they have the knowledge and efficacy to do so and the fear that they
could be harmed in some way if they did not take appropriate action.  Applying this mechanism to PW compliance,
introducing a disincentive might discourage insecure password behaviors and simultaneously protect the organization’s
security interests.   For example, if an employee’s password would also allow others to access information that the employee
wishes to keep private (e.g., personal information, such as salary), then the employee may be less likely to engage in insecure
password behaviors because of the inherent need to protect himself.
The incentives or disincentives suggested by Agency Theory and Protection Motivation Theory are conceptualized as
additional “reasons” (for or against compliance). These, along with reasons and concepts that are suggested by the other cited
theories will elicit an explanatory model of the various effects of these constructs upon password compliance.
RESEARCH MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS
General Deterrence Theory suggests that the perceived likelihood and perceived severity of sanctions against IS misuse will
have a direct impact on an individual’s intention to engage in IS misuse.  Applying this reasoning to PW compliance has
already been shown to be problematic.  It would be useful, however, to perform a more thorough examination to confirm this
problem.  Such a study would serve as evidence that the previous problem arose from the existence of alternative
explanations or is instead due to confusion on the part of participants or incomplete specification of the password-compliance
issues.  Therefore, the first proposition to be examined is:
P1:  Perceived likelihood and severity of formal sanctions will be positively related to password compliance
intention.
If alternative reasons (for or against compliance) exist, this proposition would likely not be supported.
Perceived memory limitations, as a component and antecedent of “perceived control”, may impact an individual’s intention
to comply with password guidelines.  That is, if he feels that he cannot remember a password consisting of a large number of
unrelated characters, he may be more willing to violate another portion of the password guidelines, such as writing down the
password.  His perception of his memory constraints is likely a combination of both the number of characters in the
password, the length of time that the password is valid, and the number of passwords that need to be remembered.
Therefore,
P2:  Perceived memory limitations will be negatively related to several components of password compliance
intention, specifically, “choosing a strong password” and “not writing down a password”.
Other reasons exist that impact the global motives, the behavioral intent, or both.  Some of these reasons exist in standard
password guidelines.  For example, when guidelines dictate that an employee who forgets her password will be locked out of
the system for an extended period of time, she may be more likely to engage in insecure password behaviors because the
“cost” of being locked out, or having to wait for or interact with an IT person may be perceived as greater than any likely
sanctions.
P3:  Alternative reasons, such as perceived certainty and severity of informal disincentives, will be negatively
related to password compliance intention.
Additional reasons could be introduced to create a significant impact upon global motives, behavioral intent, or both.
Reasons for or reasons against may introduce enough of a personal stake such that an individual will behave in a way that
protects his own self-interest, even if other reasons for or against are not strong enough on their own to have such an effect.
 P4:  Personal stake will be positively related to password compliance intention.
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The following model highlights the proposed relationships.  Additional research suggests the addition of personal
characteristics (e.g. age, gender) which are not included here due to space limitations.
Figure 1. Preliminary Model
METHODOLOGY
Preliminary survey results from over 100 business professionals regarding their password behaviors show correlations
between the dependent variable (password misuse) and several independent variables (specifically, length of passwords,
frequency of forced password changes, and number of passwords).  However, a more rigorous and statistically valid survey is
required.  Sources of validated survey measures are being explored and potential new measures are being considered. One
group of anticipated subjects comes from an industry security group whose members are willing to distribute surveys among
co-workers.  Surveys will also be administered to employed, part-time MBA students at two major Northeastern universities.
Factor analysis and structural equation modeling techniques will be employed for data analysis.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
· Clarification of the password-related components of the “IS misuse” construct.
· Clarification of the effects of explicit and implicit sanctions in deterring IS misuse, especially when they are
potentially in conflict.
· Explanation of the limited effects of countermeasures with regard to password security: formal sanctions are
ineffective because the strengths of alternative reasons, such as informal disincentives and perceived limitations to
memory limitations.
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· Demonstration of prescriptive measures for practitioners; introduction of single-password or other mechanisms may
encourage employees to engage in secure password behaviors.
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